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The study compares the social mobility and status attainment of first-
and second-generation Turks in nine Western European countries with
those of Western European natives and with those of Turks in Turkey.
It shows that the children of low-class migrants are more likely to
acquire a higher education than their counterparts in Turkey, making
them more educationally mobile. Moreover, they successfully convert
this education in the Western European labor market, and are upwardly
mobile relative to the first generation. When comparing labor market
outcomes of second generations relative to Turks in Turkey, however,
the results show that the same level of education leads to a higher occu-
pation in Turkey. The implications of these findings are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s and the early 1970s, facilitated by labor import contracts, a
number of Western European industries hired Turkish workers. Although
migration of Turks was intended to be temporary and contracts were
phased out after 1974, many labor migrants stayed and their numbers
subsequently bolstered by family reunification and chain migration. Turk-
ish-origin residents are now the largest extra-communitarian migrant
group in Western Europe.
Much of the research on first- and second-generation migrants in
Europe concerns the integration of the Turkish-origin population in
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destination societies. Such studies center on educational and labor market
achievements of migrants, in comparison with natives1 and/or other
migrant groups (Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado
2007 and related articles from the same journal issue; Euwals et al. 2010;
Heath and Cheung 2007; Kristen and Granato 2007; Van De Werfhorst
and Van Tubergen 2007; Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008; Phalet and
Heath 2010; Kogan 2011). They trace different forms of assimilation
(Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 2003) and note how “ethnic
penalties” (Heath and Cheung 2007) evolve over time and over genera-
tions. However, this may not be the perspective that migrants themselves
find most relevant. People do not move to compete with other groups in
the destination society but to improve their life chances — and their chil-
dren’s — relative to what they would have been in the origin society. In
other words, to understand international migration and its effects on those
building a life abroad, we must consider social origins. In this study, we
do so in two different but equally important ways. First, we compare
individuals to their parents by studying intergenerational mobility (or
rather: intergenerational reproduction) in both education and occupation.
Second, we compare Turks who migrated to Western Europe and this
group’s second generation to those who stayed in the origin country,
Turkey. This latter perspective leads to a counterfactual view of the
outcomes of migration: What would be the occupational status of first-
generation Turks, along with the educational and occupational status of
their descendants, had they not migrated to Western Europe?
Next to the commonly used destination-country perspective, our
analysis adds an origin-country perspective, revealing the benefits of
migrating in terms of achievements and possibilities for upward social
mobility compared to those left behind. We study status attainment and
social mobility (or social reproduction) processes among Turks in Turkey,
first- and second-generation Turks in Western Europe, and Western Euro-
pean natives, asking the following research questions: To what extent are
educational and occupational reproduction patterns different for Turks in
Western Europe, Turks in Turkey, and natives in destination countries?
What do these differences suggest in terms of how groups are doing in
comparative terms, especially how Turks in Western Europe are doing
relative to Turks in Turkey?
1In this paper, “natives” refers to the majoritarian population.
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The analysis draws on a dataset combining the European Social Sur-
vey (2002–2010) and European Values Study (2008); the data cover Turks
in their most common Western European destinations and in Turkey.
TURKS IN WESTERN EUROPE
Social and economic developments in Western Europe and Turkey made
these two areas into receiving and sending migration regions, respec-
tively, in the early 1960s. While Western Europe’s economic growth
after World War II created a need for a low-skilled labor force, its edu-
cational expansion decreased the number of low-skilled job seekers.
Lacking spontaneous migration from former colonies and with increasing
job vacancies in manufacturing, mining, construction, and the service
industry, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Swe-
den (countries with the largest Turkish population) looked for new
sources of manpower. A “guest worker” system was introduced, consist-
ing of formal labor import agreements between these countries and Tur-
key (Akg€und€uz 2008).
At the same time, Turkey was transforming. Between the founding
years of the Turkish Republic and the 1960s, Turkey witnessed a dramatic
population growth, provoking mass movements from rural to urban areas
(Kocaman 2008). Urbanization had increased by 17 percent in 1935,
42 percent in 1975, and 70 percent in 2011 (Karadayi 1974; UNDP
2013). Yet Turkey failed to implement large-scale industrialization, and
unemployment became an issue together with other social and economic
problems, such as big-city ghettos, segregation, and poverty (Kıray 1982).
The “excess labor” — mostly workers in agriculture and small industries
— had to choose between becoming part of the impoverished urban poor
and finding another way to maintain their income and well-being. Tem-
porary migration to Western Europe appeared a good solution; it even
became an option for the urban middle-class and low-ranking government
officials (Akg€und€uz 2008).
After labor import contracts ended in 1974, Turks continued to
migrate to Western Europe, mainly through family reunion and chain
migration. In 1973, the number in Western Europe totaled 1.35 mil-
lion, of whom 900,000 were workers and 450,000 dependents. In
spite of return flows, the Turkish population in Western Europe rose
to about two million in 1980 and three million in 2006 and now
stands at four million (Abadan-Unat 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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of Turkey 2015; UNDP 2013). As this is based on figures that only
include Turkish citizens, there are likely many more persons of Turk-
ish descent in Western Europe. Among the countries cited above, the
majority of Turks reside in Germany, with substantial numbers in
France and the Netherlands and sizable groups in other Western Euro-
pean countries.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Introduction
Practically from the beginning of migration studies, a concern for
scholars has been how migrants and their descendants are doing com-
pared to native or majoritarian populations in destination countries.
This concern led to the development of assimilation and segmented
assimilation theories (Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 1997,
2003; Zhou 1997), which seek to explain how migrants integrate —
or not — into the host society and when they acquire — if at all —
the same opportunities as the majoritarian population over time. The
concept of “ethnic penalties” emerged as part of this debate in the
European context. It refers to the difference remaining in outcomes
between migrants and native populations after background characteris-
tics are taken into account (Heath and Cheung 2007; Phalet and
Heath 2010).
We take a somewhat different approach; for a comprehensive view
of the outcomes of migration, we need to compare migrants and their
children with those left behind (Guveli et al. 2015). With the exception
of studies related to the “selection of migrants” (Borjas 1987; Feliciano
2005; Dronkers and De Heus 2009) or to earnings (see Massey et al.
1993 for a review), the literature has barely scratched the surface of this
issue.
People usually move in search of a better life, specifically when
opportunities in destination societies seem better than those at home (or
gains are higher than costs) (Sjaastad 1962). Therefore, it can be expected
that migration is usually beneficial for social mobility and career advance-
ment. In fact, one of the main objectives of labor migrants is to improve
their own and, more importantly, their children’s life prospects in com-
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parison with those left behind. This, in many cases, presupposes a wish
for intergenerational improvement, whereby children are better off than
their parents.
In what follows, we study educational and occupational attainment,
as well as processes of social mobility, for four groups: first-generation
Turks, that is, Turks born and mostly educated in Turkey who migrated
to Western Europe; second-generation Turks, that is, Turks born or
mostly educated in Western Europe; Turks in Turkey; and natives in
Western Europe.
Migrants and the OED Model
To study status attainment and social mobility, we use the Origin-Educa-
tion-Destination (OED) model, initially developed by Blau and Duncan
(1967). This model also serves as a guide for our hypotheses. The OED
model (see Figure Ia) follows two forms of reproduction: education and
occupation. On the one hand, social origins affect education: Parents
influence their children by transferring ability and cognitive skills, helping
them with their homework, sending them to better schools, or paying for
extracurricular help (OE). On the other hand, social origins affect occupa-
tion (destination) both directly and indirectly. In the latter indirect effect,
not only do high-status families more successfully position their children
in higher education than low-status families (OE), but this education has
a value in the labor market, influencing occupational outcomes (ED). In
the former, social origins directly affect occupation (OD) in a number of
ways: Parents influence their children by giving them job advice, helping
them look for a job, providing economic resources (including the trans-
mission of a family business), offering social and relational aptitudes, and
supplying a wide range of networks and connections.
We hypothesize each of the three main components of the OED
model may play out differently for each group we consider, leading to
differences in social reproduction patterns across groups. This is
expressed in arrows A1–A3 in Figure Ib,c, which includes the group
variable (G): Turks in Turkey, first- and second-generation Turks, and
Western European natives. Arrow A1 in Figure Ib expresses differences
in educational reproduction (OE); arrow A2 in Figure Ic expresses dif-
ferences in the direct effect of parental background on occupation
(OD); and arrow A3 expresses differences in returns to education
(ED).
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Figure Ib,c also shows “average group effects” for education (GE)
and occupation (GD), that is, differences created because of specific
characteristics of the groups (or processes deriving from those characteris-
tics). In the literature comparing migrants with native populations, these
average group effects are usually referred to as “ethnic penalties” (i.e., to
the detriment of the migrants) and are often attributed to discrimination
(Wrench and Modood 2000; Heath and Cheung 2006); however,
omitted factors may also include cultural values, lack of networks, poor
language skills, etc. In our analysis, “average group effects” also refers to
potential differences between Turks in Western Europe and Turks in
Turkey: For example, Turks who leave their home country may be more
Figure I. The Origin-Education-Destination (OED) Model and Its Relationship With
Groups (G)
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motivated and risk-taking than Turks those who stay, giving them a gross
advantage in destination countries over those left behind.
An important characteristic of our model is that by assuming differ-
ences in social reproduction across groups, we may find that some of the
group penalties (or gains) occur only (or to a greater/lesser extent) for
some educational levels or certain social backgrounds, indicating the exis-
tence of varied explanatory mechanisms. This may be better understood
with an example. Looking at the UK, some studies (Platt 2007; Zuccotti
2015a) find that Caribbeans with high-class backgrounds are more penal-
ized in the labor market than those with middle/low-class backgrounds.
This might suggest, for example, that on top of discrimination based on
skin color — an “average effect” — Caribbeans with high-class parental
backgrounds may also lack specific “high-class resources” (ways of behav-
ing and talking, social networks, etc.) necessary to achieve certain qualified
occupations.
By following the OED model, we look at differences between
groups by studying processes of social reproduction: We explore how OE,
ED, and OD relationships vary for each group and how this affects aver-
age differences between Turks in Europe and Turks in Turkey/Western
European natives.
Mechanisms and Hypotheses
In what follows, we use the OED model to derive our hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 refers to first-generation Turks (born and educated in
Turkey) and discusses only occupational outcomes; hypotheses 2a and
2b refer to second-generation Turks and discuss both educational and
occupational outcomes. A summary of all hypotheses appears in
Table 1.
TABLE 1
HYPOTHESES
Generation Outcome studied Hypothesis
First Occupation 1. Weaker effect of parental background (OD) and lower returns to
education (ED) compared to Turks in Turkey and Western
European (WE) natives
Second Education 2a. Weaker effect of parental background (OE) compared to
Turks in Turkey and WE natives
Occupation 2b. Weaker effect of parental background (OD) compared to
Turks in Turkey and WE natives
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Hypothesis 1 (First Generation). Our first expectation is that social
reproduction with respect to the occupational status of first-generation
Turks will differ from that of Turks in Turkey and Western European
(WE) natives in two respects. First, we expect parents of the former to be
less influential (OD) than the parents of the latter two; second, we expect
migrants to have lower returns to education (ED), that is, higher
educational levels render them less occupational status.
We expect a weaker effect of parental background on occupations
(OD) for migrants because when migrating, first-generation migrants
leave their parents behind, and with them, resources affecting their occu-
pations. As for the relationship between education and labor market out-
comes (ED), the literature consistently shows the educational
qualifications of international migrants are not always recognized; hence,
they do not have the same effect on occupational outcomes as they do
for individuals seeking jobs in their own country (Van Tubergen, Maas,
and Flap 2004; Kogan 2006; Chiswick and Miller 2007; Heath and
Cheung 2007; Kalter, Granato, and Kristen 2007; Algan et al. 2010;
Johnston et al. 2010).
How first-generation Turks do with respect to Turks in Turkey will
depend on the differences in the role of education and parental back-
ground in Western Europe and Turkey. For example, although depending
less on parental resources might be detrimental for migrants whose parents
have higher social backgrounds, it might be better for those who have left
their lower social class parental backgrounds behind, as is the case for
most first-generation migrant Turks. As regards the role of education, the
match between educational credentials and labor market will probably be
weaker for first-generation Turks with a Turkish diploma looking for a
job in the Western European labor market than for Turks searching for a
job in Turkey. While in terms of income and employment, migrants may
find better chances outside their home country, a weaker match between
education and occupation might give an overall advantage to Turks in
Turkey, especially among those with higher educational levels. Finally, we
need to consider unmeasured factors: for example, discrimination in the
Western European labor market, which might give an overall advantage to
Turks in Turkey, or a very high motivation among migrants, which might
give an overall advantage to Turks in Western Europe.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b (Second Generation). There is much debate about
the fortunes of the children of migrants. Although some studies say
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disadvantages might persist over generations (Portes and Zhou 1993;
Zhou 1997) or social mobility might be “blocked” (Pichler 2011), others
expect an improvement over time; more importantly, the children of
migrants are likely to do better than their parents (Alba and Nee 1997,
2003), especially when arriving parents have low social backgrounds
(Zhou et al. 2008), as in the Turkish case.
We hypothesize the children of Turks will not only do better than
their parents but will be less dependent on them in terms of education
and occupation than Turks in Turkey (and, presumably, Western Eur-
opean natives). We expect to find lower social reproduction levels for
Turks in Western Europe than for Turks in Turkey; we expect these to
be mainly the outcome of higher educational mobility (weaker OE) (Hy-
pothesis 2a) and, to a lesser extent, of a weaker direct effect of parental
occupation on individuals’ occupation (OD) (Hypothesis 2b). Further-
more, as a consequence of Hypothesis 2a, we expect second-generation
Turks to be in a better position than those left behind in terms of edu-
cation.
Migrants want better lives for their children and will invest in them
(Dustmann 2008). Indeed, there is evidence of increased educational
mobility among second-generation migrants (see Heath, Rothon, and
Kilpi 2008 for a review). A German study shows the influence of the
father’s education on the chances of children reaching the Abitur is smal-
ler for second-generation Turks than for natives (Kristen and Granato
2007). While this implies a higher parental education is less of an advan-
tage for Turks than for natives, it also suggests that a low starting point
— common among the descendants of Turkish migrants — might not be
as detrimental for Turks.
Motivation and high parental aspirations are often used to explain
educational mobility among ethnic minorities (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi
2008); furthermore, there is evidence that the parents of second-genera-
tion Turks have particularly high aspirations for their children (Abadan-
Unat 2011). If so, a lower dependence on the (usually low) parental back-
ground among Turks in Western Europe means better educational out-
comes compared to those left behind. Supporting this statement, a recent
study shows Turkish children in Europe perform better (higher PISA test
scores) than children in Turkey, given equal parental backgrounds (Dust-
mann, Frattini, and Lanzara 2012).
Regarding occupational outcomes, the OED model shows that the
parental effect on occupation is mediated by the role of education: For
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second-generation Turks, and in line with previous findings on social
mobility of ethnic minorities (see, e.g., Platt 2007; Zuccotti 2015a), we
expect education attainment to be the main gateway to social mobility.
However, we also suggest the parental pressure to do well in the destina-
tion country might be expressed in the direct encouragement to find a
good job and progress in a career; this will be reflected in a weaker direct
effect of (the relatively low) parental class on children’s occupations
(OD). Note that although entrepreneurship among Turks might be a way
to keep the relationship between parents and children strong, the number
of entrepreneurial parents in our sample is small compared to the number
of parents in manual jobs.
In determining how well Turks in Western Europe do compared to
those left behind in terms of occupation, if educational mobility is higher
for the former and this is, in turn, translated into better positions in the
labor market, Turks in Western Europe will probably be advantaged
(especially those with lower social backgrounds). However, if “ethnic
penalties” are present for the second generation — expressed, for example,
in discrimination — this might attenuate the (expected) advantage over
those left behind. The low performance for second-generation migrants
has been acknowledged by studies exploring access to higher status jobs
(Crul and Doomernik 2003; Simon 2003; Kogan 2006; Heath and Che-
ung 2007; Silberman, Alba, and Fournier 2007; Heath, Rothon, and
Kilpi 2008). Yet most do not consider parental background in their mod-
els, generating a possible bias in their conclusions, as in the UK case
(Zuccotti 2015a).
DATA AND MEASUREMENT
Our analysis uses the European Social Survey (ESS 2002, 2004, 2006,
2008, and 2010) and one round of the European Values Study (EVS
2008). Taken together, these six surveys cover almost all European pop-
ulations and Turkey, making it possible to compare Turkish first and
second generation migrants, Turkish non-migrants, and Western Euro-
pean natives. While primarily social attitudes surveys, ESS and EVS
stand out for their detailed inventory of migration status, with questions
on country of birth of respondents and their parents, period of arrival,
nationality, and language spoken at home. Both have relatively good
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information on parents’ educations and occupations and respondents’
corresponding status. There are minor differences in how data are col-
lected and processed, both between ESS and EVS and between ESS
rounds.
Our four main comparison groups are as follows: Turks in Tur-
key;2 Turks in Western Europe, comprising first generation (born and
mostly educated in Turkey) and second generation (born or mostly edu-
cated in Western Europe); and Western European natives. For ESS
2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 and EVS, we consider Turkish migrants
as those individuals interviewed in Western Europe who were born in
Turkey, or have at least one parent born in Turkey (more than 90 per-
cent have two parents born in Turkey) or have Turkish citizenship. For
ESS 2002, we define Turks as those who speak Turkish as a first or
second language, or are Turkish citizens, or were born in Turkey. ESS
2002 only asked for the continent of birth of parents, an ambiguous
measure, as 12 percent of Turks live in the European part of Turkey.
Western European natives and Turks in Turkey are those who, along
with their parents, were born in one of the Western European countries
in our sample or in Turkey, respectively. We restrict our analysis to
nine countries where Turkish migrants are found by ESS or EVS: Ger-
many, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark,
Sweden, and Norway. We exclude Bulgaria and Greece because persons
of Turkish descent in these countries are generally not labor migrants;
we exclude Luxembourg because it has few Turks. All countries are
available in both surveys and all rounds, except Austria, which is not
available in ESS 2008 and 2010, and Turkey, which is not available in
ESS 2002, 2006, and 2010. Information on the total number of
respondents per survey/round and country appears in Table S1, in the
online version of this article.
2 “Turks in Turkey” include those living in rural areas and those in cities (which include
rural-urban migrants as well: recall that urbanization has greatly increased in the past 40
years). Moreover, it includes ethnic minorities, such as Kurds, as well. We ran tests (avail-
able upon request) to explore these sub-group differences and found that the comparison
of Turks in Western Europe and Turks in Turkey leads to similar results, independently
of the rural/urban location of Turks in Turkey and their ethnic belonging. Note, however,
that — by including social origins in our analysis — a key assumption is that Turks in
Western Europe compare themselves with Turks in Turkey with similar socioeconomic
backgrounds.
SOCIAL MOBILITY OF TURKISH MIGRANTS 11
Although ESS and EVS are part of large-scale projects with standard-
ized procedures for collecting data, for which high comparability can be
expected, a possible weakness is the representation of migrants, including
Turks. For example, as questionnaires are only in the language of the coun-
try, lower educated and more recent migrants may be underrepresented in
the sample. Three comments on this are as follows: First, although we are
studying first and second generations, the crucial comparisons are with the
latter group, as their outcomes express longer-term processes of integration
and are more interesting when compared to Western European natives and
Turks in Turkey. Second, even if only the better-off Turks (in terms of edu-
cation and occupation) are present in the sample, we are making use of a
crucial variable to control for this: parental background. Finally, our results
go in the same direction as those of a previous cross-national study on “eth-
nic penalties” (Heath and Cheung 2007). Specifically, when looking at
access to managerial and professional occupations (I and II in the EGP class
scheme)3 for second-generation Turks and Western European natives (only
in ESS rounds) and controlling for age and education, we find a negative
effect — or “ethnic penalty” — for second-generation Turks compared to
natives.
Our criterion for defining first- and second-generation Turks is place
of education. We use a “majority” rule whereby individuals are assigned
to the first generation if they were born and completed most of their edu-
cation (>50%) in Turkey and to the second generation if they were born
or mostly educated in Western Europe. For individuals born in Turkey,
the differentiation between first and second generations uses the person’s
age, age of arrival in the destination country, and estimated age when
education was finished. We approximate the years of education necessary
to finish a certain educational level, assuming individuals enter the educa-
tional system at age six.4 For example, a person who finished upper sec-
ondary education (around age 18) and emigrated at age 15 is considered
to have done most of his/her studies in Turkey but if emigrating at age
3We created the EGP (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) classes I and II using syntax in:
http://www.harryganzeboom.nl/isco88/index.htm.
4Following UNESCO (2006), age limits are as follows: not completed primary education
(6–9 years old); primary education or first stage of basic education (6–12 years old); lower
secondary or second stage of basic education (6–15 years old); (upper) secondary educa-
tion (6–18 years old); post-secondary non-tertiary education (6–20 years old); first stage of
tertiary education (6–22 years old); and second stage of tertiary education (6–26 years
old). When ISCED was missing, we used the declared years of education.
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10 is considered to have done the majority in Western Europe. This vari-
able is easily constructed in ESS 2010 and EVS, as they collect the precise
age of arrival. For other ESS rounds, the variable was approximated.5
Table 2 shows the distribution of the four comparison groups by
survey/year and destination country. The proportion of first- and second-
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPARISON GROUPS BY SURVEY/ROUND AND COUNTRY (PERCENTAGE). POPULATION
18–65a
Turks in Turkey Turk 1st Turk 2nd WE natives
Survey/round
ESS1 0.0 18.4 16.5 19.7
ESS2 29.4 18.8 19.9 19.0
ESS3 0.0 16.7 18.2 18.8
ESS4 35.3 17.5 15.2 15.4
ESS5 0.0 15.8 18.9 14.4
European Values Study 35.3 12.8 11.4 12.8
Country
Austria 0.0 8.5 13.1 8.7
Belgium 0.0 9.4 10.4 10.2
Switzerland 0.0 18.4 10.1 8.8
Germany 0.0 26.9 36.0 16.5
Denmark 0.0 6.8 5.4 10.8
France 0.0 2.6 4.0 10.6
The Netherlands 0.0 15.4 14.5 12.1
Norway 0.0 4.7 1.3 11.7
Sweden 0.0 7.3 5.1 10.7
Turkey 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 2,198 234 297 55,329
Note: ISEI, International Socio-Economic Index; WE, Western European.
aThe sample is restricted to individuals with valid ISEI, education, and parents’ ISEI.
5Instead of the exact variable, we use crude categories: arrived last year; between 1 and
5 years; between 6 and 10 years; between 11 and 20 years; and between 21 years and
more. For the first two categories, we assume education was mostly done in Turkey. For
the latter three, we approximate the likelihood of having finished more than 50 percent of
education in the country of destination by creating a continuous variable running from 0
to 1. Consider a 23-year-old person with primary education who emigrated between 11
and 20 years ago. This person studied between the ages of 6 and 13 and arrived in Wes-
tern Europe between the ages of 3 and 12 (approximate values). In total, primary studies
take around 7 years. If the person emigrated at 10, 11, or 12 years old, we assume he/she
completed most education in Turkey (at least 4 years of 7). If the person emigrated at 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 years of age, we consider most studies were completed in Western Eur-
ope. She/he receives a value of 7/10 (or 0.7): in seven of the 10 possible ages of arrival,
she/he did most of his/her education in Western Europe. This continuous variable is later
dichotomized: Those with values up to 0.5 are assigned to the first generation and those
higher than 0.5 to the second generation (around 30% of all Turks have intermediate val-
ues).
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generation Turks is similar in all data sources. Note: Although our
respondents are disproportionately situated in Germany, Turks in Ger-
many are underrepresented (when compared to Turkish figures)6; this is
the logical consequence of the ESS/EVS sampling design.
The time of arrival is a key piece of information. The vast majority of
first-generation Turks in our data (around 70%) arrived in 1980 or later,
probably migrating as part of family reunion or chain migration processes.
Among second-generation Turks born in Turkey rather than the destina-
tion country (36%), around 78 percent arrived before 1980, thus living
more than 20 years in the destination country.7
Respondents and their parents’ educational qualifications are mea-
sured with the International Standard Classification of Education
(ISCED-97), which ranges from 0 (incomplete primary) to 6 (postgradu-
ate level of tertiary education). We scale these into approximate years of
education8 and replace the missing cases with the stated years of education
completed (for respondents only). We prefer qualifications scaled by dura-
tion over stated duration, following Hout and DiPrete (2006). In EVS,
only the father’s education is collected, except for households headed by
single mothers. For parents in ESS, we consider the maximum value of
father and mother. In all surveys, the reference time for parental informa-
tion is when the respondent is 14 years old.
Respondents’ occupations (current or last) are measured with the
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), available
for all countries and years: These have been transformed into the Interna-
tional Socio-Economic Index [ISEI] of occupational status (Ganzeboom
and Treiman 1996), which varies between 16 and 90. For parental occupa-
tions, in EVS the respondent is asked about the father’s occupation (for sin-
gle-mother households, the mother’s occupation), and in ESS, both the
father and mother’s occupation. In all surveys, ISCO codes are available for
most cases, but ESS also has crude self-classification scores, which are con-
verted into their approximate ISCO equivalent. For ESS, we convert both
detailed ISCO and crude measures into ISEI scores (for father and mother),
6Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Abadan-Unat 2011).
7Values refer to individuals with valid International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI), educa-
tion, and parents’ ISEI.
8Not completed primary education (3.25 years); primary education or first stage of basic
education (6.5 years); lower secondary or second stage of basic education (9.5 years); (up-
per) secondary education (13 years); post-secondary non-tertiary education (14.25); first
stage of tertiary education (16.5 years); and second stage of tertiary education (20.5 years).
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we then take the average between both ISEI versions (for father and
mother), and finally, we consider the maximum value between both parents.
Analysis is based on OLS regressions, with separate models for men
and women. Educational attainment covers people between 25 and 65,
while occupational attainment covers those from 18 to 65. We exclude
those older than 65, given the very few older Turks in Western Europe.
ANALYSIS
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables broken down by
comparison group and gender. Parental education and occupational status
are higher for first-generation Turks than for those who stayed behind;
this also applies to their education. These values point to a positive selec-
tion of Turks in Western Europe. As for occupational status, despite dif-
ferences in education and parental backgrounds favoring migrants, first-
generation Turks have either similar (men) or lower (women) occupa-
tional status than their counterparts in Turkey. Unlike Turks in Turkey,
the first generation maintains the level of their parents’ occupational sta-
tuses. Finally, we observe an wide gap in ISEI when comparing them to
Western European natives, as most previous literature has shown.
Table 3 reveals that second-generation Turks have clearly moved up
the educational hierarchy relative to those left behind and to their parents
but have not quite reached the level of Western European natives. For occu-
pational status, second-generation Turks are collectively quite mobile
TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY COMPARISON GROUP AND GENDER (MEANS)
Men Women
Turks in
Turkey
Turk
1st
Turk
2nd
WE
natives
Turks in
Turkey
Turk
1st
Turk
2nd
WE
natives
Parents’ education 6.4 7.9 9.2 11.6 6.2 8.5 8.7 11.5
Education 9.5 10.7 12.3 13.6 7.9 10.2 11.9 13.4
Parents’ ISEI 30.8 34.3 33.8 43.7 33.1 33.6 32.4 43.5
ISEI 36.3 35.8 38.1 46.0 42.0 31.8 39.9 44.6
Age 39.1 41.2 31.1 43.4 34.9 39.3 29.5 43.5
Total 25–60a 1,549 152 123 24,685 1,963 100 88 25,796
Total 18–60b 1,540 154 170 27,273 658 80 127 28,050
Total 18–60c 1,890 162 190 28,605 2,382 110 155 29,606
Notes: ISEI, International Socio-Economic Index; WE, Western European.
aTotal sample 25–60 with valid education and parents’ education and ISEI (total for the first two percentage rows).
bTotal sample 18–60 with valid education, ISEI, and parents’ ISEI (total for the last three percentage rows).
cTotal sample 18–60 with valid education and parents’ ISEI.
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relative to their parents and are approaching (but not quite reaching) the
level of Western European natives. Despite their higher levels of education,
the occupational status of second-generation male Turks is only slightly
higher than that of those left behind, while the women have even lower sta-
tus than their compatriots at home. Note: In Turkey, the number of women
with a valid ISEI score — implying they are either currently employed or
have been in the past — is relatively smaller (N = 658). While in Turkey,
more than 70 percent of women have never worked (or do not declare so in
these surveys), in Western Europe this drops to around 18 percent for sec-
ond-generation Turkish women. In addition, lower educated women in
Turkey are more likely to be out of the labor market than higher educated
women (figures available upon request).
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the regression models for
education and occupation for the four comparison groups, differentiated
by gender. The age of the respondent is set at 35; the independent
variables (parents’ education and occupation, respondents’ education) are
standardized into z-scores, so they have equal standard deviations, making
coefficients comparable.9 All models control for survey/year dummies (not
shown). Although we are interested in the average situation of Turks in
Western Europe, we explored country effects by adding country dummies
(see Tables S2 and S3); the models with country dummies were very simi-
lar to the ones presented.10 For the purposes of this study and ease of
interpretation, we discuss the tables without country dummies. Finally,
Figures IIa–IIIb add graphical illustrations to key findings in Tables 4
and 5: Figure IIa,b shows educational mobility for the various groups
(based on Models 3a and 3b from Table 4); and Figure IIIa,b shows
returns to education (based on Models 4a and 4b from Table 5).11
9Although group distributions are different, the results are the same with non-standardized
coefficients.
10We did find, however, some country differences. Regarding educational outcomes, only
the Austrian case is different from the rest: Here, second-generation Turks do not seem to
gain an educational advantage over those left behind. The results on occupational attain-
ment show Turks in Germany (especially the first generation) are particularly disadvan-
taged in terms of occupational status compared to Turks in Turkey; the opposite is
observed in Austria and the Netherlands.
11Predicted values in Figures IIa–IIIb refer to individuals who are 35 years old; variables
not observed in the figures are set to the mean. To construct the figures, we use
margins and marginsplot commands in STATA (version 13.1; StataCorp, 4905
Lakeway Drive, College Station, Texas 77845, USA).
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Table 4 shows first-generation Turks to have significantly higher levels
of education than Turks in Turkey (the reference group in all models)
(Models 1a and 1b, Table 4); this difference remains statistically significant
even after controlling for parental background (Models 2a and 2b).
Although we do not focus on educational outcomes of first generations in
our theoretical background and hypotheses, it is interesting to note they are
a positively selected group (Models 2a and 2b) but at the same time disad-
vantaged when compared to Western European natives. Models 3a,3b add
an interaction between parental education and group; they reveal (even if
only the female model is discussed) the education of first-generation Turkish
women depends significantly less on their parents’ education (expressed by
the negative interaction effect) than does the education of those remaining
in Turkey. This leads to a relative advantage for the migrants when consider-
ing those with lower parental education (Figure IIb). The results show Tur-
key to be a much less mobile society in terms of education than Western
European countries: The steeper line in Figure IIa,b reveals that the educa-
tion of individuals depends more on their parents’ education.
Following the first generation into the Western European labor
market (Table 5), we find first-generation Turkish women to have lower
occupational attainment than Turks in Turkey and Western European
natives, while men are only disadvantaged relative to the latter (Models
1a and 1b). After controlling for background characteristics (education
plays the major role), the effect for first-generation Turkish men
becomes significantly negative, denoting a disadvantage compared to
Turks in Turkey; a similar effect is seen for women, but they experience
a larger disadvantage in general. Note the change in the effect for Wes-
tern European natives (from positive to negative) which implies that,
given equal background conditions (again the effect is driven by educa-
tion), a higher occupation is obtained in Turkey. This makes the differ-
ence between first-generation Turks and Turks in Turkey larger than the
difference between the former and Western European natives (Models
2a and 2b).
For social reproduction processes (see interaction effects between
parental occupation and group in Models 3a and 3b), we do not find
statistically significant differences, although the negative interaction effect
points to a lower dependence of first-generation Turks on parental occu-
pation, as compared to Turks in Turkey. This is mainly driven by lower
returns to education (see interaction effects between education and group
in Models 4a and 4b) — as partially expected in Hypothesis 1 — for
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first-generation Turks compared to Western European natives and Turks
in Turkey, particularly for women (returns to education are the highest
in Turkey). These results may be better observed in Figure IIIa,b. Here,
we see the higher the educational level, the higher the difference
between first-generation Turks and Turks in Turkey. For example, the
prediction for men with 12 years of education is 39 ISEI points for
first-generation Turks and 42 ISEI points for Turks in Turkey; this
three-point difference rises to six points for individuals with 15 years of
education. Figure IIIb also shows that gaps are larger among women:
Comparisons of individuals with 12 years of education show a gap of
12 points in ISEI; the gap for 15 years of education is 15. However,
fewer women have (or have had) a job in Turkey, pointing to possible
selection mechanisms for this group.
TABLE 4
EDUCATION (YEARS) BY COMPARISON GROUP (REF = TURKS IN TURKEY), PARENTS’ EDUCATION
(PEDUC), PARENTS’ ISEI (PISEI), AND AGEa (MEN AND WOMEN 25–65). MODELS CONTROL FOR
SURVEY/ROUNDb
Men Women
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
Constant 9.74 11.46 12.55 8.40 10.18 11.52
(0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.14)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.13)***
Turk 1st 1.40 0.80 0.28 2.47 1.68 0.41
(0.27)*** (0.24)*** (0.34) (0.32)*** (0.29)*** (0.36)
Turk 2nd 2.77 2.00 0.40 3.70 3.11 1.98
(0.30)*** (0.27)*** (0.32) (0.34)*** (0.31)*** (0.37)***
WE natives 4.45 2.25 1.14 6.07 3.91 2.57
(0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.14)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.13)***
PEDUC 1.30 2.23 1.24 2.31
(0.02)*** (0.09)*** (0.02)*** (0.09)***
Turk 1st*
PEDUC
0.23 0.98
(0.27) (0.28)***
Turk 2nd*
PEDUC
1.91 0.74
(0.28)*** (0.31)**
WE natives*
PEDUC
0.97 1.13
(0.10)*** (0.09)***
PISEI 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.40
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Age 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.04
(0.00)*** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Adj. R2 0.11 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.36 0.37
N 26,509 26,509 26,509 27,947 27,947 27,947
Notes: ISEI, International Socio-Economic Index; WE, Western European.
aThe values are B-coefficients (SE) from OLS regressions. PEDUC and PISEI are z-scores and Age centered at 35.
bThe constant refers to Turks in Turkey in European Values Study.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; and *p < 0.10.
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Figure II. Education by Parents’ Education; (a) men (confidence intervals: 90%; based
on Model 3a from Table 4) and (b) women (confidence intervals: 90%;
based on Model 3b from Table 4)
20 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW
Figure III. Occupation (ISEI) by Education; (a) men (confidence intervals: 90%; based
on Model 4a from Table 5) and (b) women (confidence intervals: 90%;
based on Model 4b from Table 5)
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Thus, on average, migration to Europe has not given an occupa-
tional advantage to most first-generation Turks over those left behind.
Although we do not find a weaker direct effect of parental background on
occupations (OD), we find (Hypothesis 1) that both men and women
experience lower returns to education (ED) in the destination countries,
making those with relatively higher education more disadvantaged com-
pared to Turks in Turkey and Western European natives. The gap is even
larger when comparing first-generation women with their counterparts in
Turkey, suggesting differences in Western European and Turkish labor
markets in terms of the value of education (the disadvantage practically
disappears for lower educated men).
Moving to the second-generation Turks, Table 4 shows, on average
(after controlling for age), second-generation Turkish men and women are
more educated than their counterparts in Turkey but still less educated
than Western European natives (Models 1a and 1b). When controlling
for parental education and occupation (Models 2a and 2b), differences
with Western European natives vanish for men, but remain statistically
significant for women, although differences between the genders in educa-
tional achievement are neither large nor statistically significant (tests avail-
able upon request). Meanwhile, the positive difference with Turks in
Turkey remains. Models 3a and 3b show second-generation Turks are
more educationally mobile than Turks in Turkey (and compared to Wes-
tern European natives). Going to Figure IIa,b, we observe men and women
who have parents with lower educational levels (the majority of Turks in
Western Europe) are particularly advantaged. For example, while the pre-
dicted education for a male Turk in Turkey with parents averaging six years
of education is 10.0 years of education, for a second-generation Turk, it is
12.3. Second-generation Turkish women (but not men) are similarly advan-
taged among those with higher educated parents. This result confirms Hy-
pothesis 2a: The majority of second-generation Turks are doing better in
terms of education than Turks in Turkey, with a weaker parental effect on
education (OE), the main driver.
In Table 5, Models 1a and 1b (which only control for age) show,
on average, the occupational status of the second generation has improved
compared to the first generation, likely related to their educational
improvements in the destination country. When we compare them to
Turks in Turkey, we observe an advantage for Turkish men in Western
Europe. Nevertheless, the status of the second generation remains lower
than that among Western European natives. After controlling education
22 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW
and parental background (Models 2a and 2b), similar to what was
observed for the first generation, second-generation Turks are now disad-
vantaged with respect to Turks in Turkey. At the same time, differences
with Western European natives vanish.12 In other words, although sec-
ond-generation Turks may have improved their situation in the destina-
tion country, under equal conditions, they would have had a better
occupational status in Turkey.
For occupational mobility, Models 3a and 3b of Table 5 show the
total contribution of parental occupation, before the mediation of the level
of education. For second-generation Turks, the parental background is
much less important in determining occupational achievements than for
Turks in Turkey or for Western European natives. This can be seen in the
negative — and substantial — interaction coefficients for this group
(although for women differences are not statistically significant). When edu-
cation is added (Models 4a and 4b), the difference in the effect of parental
occupation reduces substantially for both genders, showing the strong medi-
ating role of education in intergenerational reproduction; however, it
becomes statistically non-significant, not giving good evidence of Hypothesis
2b. Looking at the returns to education, we see the effect of education is
smaller for second-generation Turks than for Turks in Turkey, although dif-
ferences are statistically significant only for women. When these results are
plotted in Figure III, both men and women, particularly the latter, are more
disadvantaged with respect to Turks in Turkey (and to Western European
natives) at higher educational levels. For example, while among women with
12 years of education the gap between second-generation Turkish women
and women in Turkey is four points in ISEI in favor of the latter, among
those with 15 years of education the gap jumps to seven points.
12Although previous studies (see Heath and Cheung 2007) found ethnic penalties for sec-
ond-generation Turks in access to the managerial/professional occupations (EGP classes I
and II), we believe that the lack of a penalty with respect to Western European natives in
our study is connected to two factors. On the one hand, the study of ethnic penalties
based on ISEI draws a more favorable picture of second-generation Turks in Western Eur-
ope than studies based on access to highly qualified occupations. (Note that we do find
penalties similar to those in Heath and Cheung [2007] when we study the access to those
occupations in our data — analyses available upon request). On the other, and this is
probably the most important factor, we control for the parental social background. In fact,
when the class of origin is introduced in both ISEI and EGP estimations, the ethnic pen-
alty disappears, showing that the relatively lower parental background of second-generation
Turks helps explain differences with natives (see Zuccotti 2015b for a discussion on this).
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All in all, the second generation is doing better than the first genera-
tion in terms of occupation and is integrating into the European labor
market. These Turks are much less dependent on their parents’ back-
ground than those in Turkey, especially in terms of education (OE),
allowing them to reach higher educational levels and get better jobs.
Migration thus gives an initial advantage to the descendants of those with
lower social backgrounds, as the children can separate their outcomes
from their origins. This general advantage in terms of occupation vanishes
once we control for education. In fact, in Turkey, education has an over-
all greater value when accessing occupations, compared to Western
Europe. Consequently, even if second-generation Turks are not disadvan-
taged with respect to Western European natives in equality of educational
outcomes, they obtain lower occupational statuses than Turks in Turkey,
on average. For women, there are significantly higher returns to education
(ED) in Turkey, compared to both Western European natives and sec-
ond-generation Turks; this increases the gap among the higher educated.
A similar pattern is observed for first-generation women (however,
remember that the working women in Turkey are a much more selective
group).
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Many studies on migrants’ integration in Western Europe look for evi-
dence of “ethnic penalties” by comparing migrants with native popula-
tions in various outcomes, including education and occupation. We select
an alternative perspective, focusing on social origins and comparing to
those left behind. Improving with respect to parents and to those remain-
ing in the origin country is, we believe, a priority for migrants who move
for economic reasons. This perspective also allows a counterfactual ques-
tion: What would have happened to migrants and their offspring had they
decided to stay? Main findings are summarized in Table 6.
Overall, for first-generation Turks, migration has led to lower occu-
pational status than they would have obtained in Turkey. Their poor per-
formance in the destination countries is no surprise; economic gains,
mainly in terms of money, are an important part of the motivation to
move, but this often implies sacrifices in occupational status. Their lower
returns to education as compared to those of Turks in Turkey and Wes-
tern European natives (Hypothesis 1) might indicate a lack of recognition
of their educational credentials, along with discrimination and difficulties
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in the labor market. Moreover, the difference between first-generation
Turks and Turks in Turkey is amplified by characteristics of the Turkish
labor market itself. On the one hand, given equal education and parental
background, in Turkey it is possible to attain higher occupations than in
Western Europe, on average. On the other hand, but only for women,
returns to education are higher in Turkey (although women are much less
likely to have an occupation in Turkey).
Outcomes for the second generation suggest longer-term
consequences of migration and help to implement the counterfactual
perspective. Here, the comparisons with Turks in Turkey suggest the
migration project has mixed results. The second generation is more suc-
cessful than its Turkish counterparts in educational achievement, mainly
driven by a lower dependence on parental education (Hypothesis 2a), lead-
ing Turks from low-class backgrounds (the majority in Western Europe) to
achieve higher education status in Western Europe than in Turkey. This
finding supports the classic suggestion that migrants are motivated to
achieve a better life for themselves and their children. The second-genera-
tion Turks in Europe might also have benefitted from richer cultural capi-
tal and gained from educational expansion in European countries since the
1960s, although a similar but slower progress has been taking place in Tur-
key since 1980 (OECD 2012) (nevertheless, educational expansion does
not necessarily generate social mobility in a society).
For occupation, on average, second-generation Turks are doing bet-
ter than the first generation and better than Turks in Turkey. However,
TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Generation Outcome studied Main findings
First Occupation First-generation Turks in Western Europe are disadvantaged in
terms of occupation with respect to Turks in Turkey, and this is
especially strong among the higher educated, as expected from
Hypothesis 1: For Turks in Turkey (as for Western European
natives), education has a greater value in the labor market
Second Education Second-generation Turks in Western Europe reach higher
educational levels as compared to those left behind; this is thanks
to higher (upward) educational mobility, as expected from
Hypothesis 2a
Occupation Second-generation Turks in Western Europe are disadvantaged in
terms of occupation with respect to Turks in Turkey, in particular
highly educated women; this is mainly because in Turkey
education
has a greater value in the labor market. We do not find strong
evidence of lower OD effect, as expected from Hypothesis 2b
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the advantage over those left behind reverses once education is taken into
account, mostly because the value of education in Western European and
Turkish labor markets varies: Specifically, given a certain education, an
individual gets higher occupational status in Turkey than in Western Eur-
ope. For second-generation women, the disadvantage with respect to those
left behind is amplified by the existence of higher returns to education in
Turkey. Summing up, even though the majority of second-generation
Turks do not suffer “ethnic penalties,” they cannot reach the same occu-
pational levels as their counterparts back home. Note: We do not find
strong evidence of a lower parental direct effect on occupation for second
generation (Hypothesis 2b).
Has migration to Western Europe been beneficial for Turks? We are
inclined to say yes. The opportunities for the children of low-class Turk-
ish migrants to acquire a relatively higher education and converting this
education in the labor market represents a positive outcome. While in
Turkey, at the same levels of parental occupation and education, the occu-
pational status is higher on average (particularly for highly educated
women), the possibility of a child with a low-class background reaching a
higher occupational status through education, thus differentiating him/her
from his/her parents, is less likely. Furthermore, among women, there is a
gain in access to the labor market. That said, research shows educational
outcomes of second-generation Turks vary in different European destina-
tion countries (Crul and Schneider 2010), possibly having differential
impacts on their labor market careers across European destination coun-
tries. Therefore, although educational mobility, the main driving force of
the benefits of migration, is a pattern we find for Turks in most Western
European countries, more country-specific analyses might illuminate the
extent of the advantages and disadvantages of migration.
Our novel origin-country perspective compares migrants and their
offspring with their counterparts who stayed in Turkey. The approach has
much to offer to international migration studies. For example, researchers
can trace the influence of migration on family processes, friendships and
networks, cultural, religious and political behavior, values and lifestyles,
health, and well-being. Notably, the perspective answers recent calls to
avoid methodological nationalism in international migration studies and
to search for mechanisms behind migration processes and their impact on
the whereabouts of migrants and their descendants, rather than aiming to
answer policy-driven research questions of the destination-country nations
(Amelina and Faist 2012; Guveli 2015; Guveli et al. 2015). We expect
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our work will trigger further research on other aspects of integration, and
we anticipate a more complete understanding of the penalties and benefits
of migration.
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